I might ask about what the nature of that purpose is (and how "fundamental" it has to be), but that would diverge from the subject onto ontology.
Well, that diversion might be worthwhile. One of the problems I'm wondering about in this conversation is, how do you judge the worth of one hierarchy of concepts from within a different hierarchy? I guess that's an ontological matter as much as anything.
Rather than that role can be reduced to purpose or vice versa, it seems that they're both shades of the same thing: they're links of meaningful direction to either an action (purpose) or to a way of being (a role). By direction, I mean that they say "this is better than that", and by meaningful, that the reason or impact is not spurious (as such, carries "meaning"). Is that, too, a hierarchy?
I think so, yeah -- but it's a different hierarchy, with meaning more important than purpose or role.
While I'm here, what do you mean by a "false purpose"?
Say you hold a very high standard of purpose: it has to be given to you by the universe, otherwise it could just as easily be invented.
Er, I see how a false purpose exists in that sense, but was that the sense you meant when you said you think that false purposes exist? If you did mean it in that sense, the point seems trivial. Though if it's been too long between replies, of course, that question might have become unanswerable -- sorry about that.
Finally, to return to the earliest question: what can give purpose its needed weight? I do not know, but I think the question has an empirical answer.
How could we find out, then? If it has an empirical answer, it should be possible.
Find the people whose purposes have the requisite weight (whose purposes provide an effective organizing principle for their actions and life), then ask them about (and otherwise investigate) those purposes. I call this matter empirical because we already know that some purposes, for some people, have that weight, even though the theoretical question of how a purpose acquires weight seems intractable. (And yeah, it's just as intractable to me as it is to you.)
In any case, I did not intend to be rude towards you.
Re: Purpose
Well, that diversion might be worthwhile. One of the problems I'm wondering about in this conversation is, how do you judge the worth of one hierarchy of concepts from within a different hierarchy? I guess that's an ontological matter as much as anything.
Rather than that role can be reduced to purpose or vice versa, it seems that they're both shades of the same thing: they're links of meaningful direction to either an action (purpose) or to a way of being (a role). By direction, I mean that they say "this is better than that", and by meaningful, that the reason or impact is not spurious (as such, carries "meaning"). Is that, too, a hierarchy?
I think so, yeah -- but it's a different hierarchy, with meaning more important than purpose or role.
While I'm here, what do you mean by a "false purpose"?
Say you hold a very high standard of purpose: it has to be given to you by the universe, otherwise it could just as easily be invented.
Er, I see how a false purpose exists in that sense, but was that the sense you meant when you said you think that false purposes exist? If you did mean it in that sense, the point seems trivial. Though if it's been too long between replies, of course, that question might have become unanswerable -- sorry about that.
Finally, to return to the earliest question: what can give purpose its needed weight? I do not know, but I think the question has an empirical answer.
How could we find out, then? If it has an empirical answer, it should be possible.
Find the people whose purposes have the requisite weight (whose purposes provide an effective organizing principle for their actions and life), then ask them about (and otherwise investigate) those purposes. I call this matter empirical because we already know that some purposes, for some people, have that weight, even though the theoretical question of how a purpose acquires weight seems intractable. (And yeah, it's just as intractable to me as it is to you.)
In any case, I did not intend to be rude towards you.
It's fine, you didn't come across that way.